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Issue I

COURTREPORTS

found Corps' methodology for measuring economic impact deeply
flawed and prejudicial. Because of these deficiencies, the dissent
urged for reversal of the judgment.
Despite the dissent's arguments, the majority agreed with the trial
court that the Corps took the required hard look and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
Tim Cronin
TENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding
that the United States Army Corps of Engineers regulated tributaries to
navigable waters under a permissible interpretation of the Clean Water
Act because there was a sufficient nexus where pollution discharged in
tributaries had a potential to move downstream and pollute navigable
waters).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a ruling by the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming which found
Edward Hubenka ("Hubenka") guilty of three counts of discharging
pollutants into the Wind River in violation of the Clean Water Act
("Act"), 33 U.S.C §§ 1311(a) and 1319(c) (2) (A). Hubenka sought to
divert the flow of the Wind River, which was a braided stream, to prevent the erosion of its banks from threatening an irrigation channel
supplying his nearby property. The Wind River, after joining the Little
Wind River and the Popo Agie River, eventually becomes the Big Horn
River which joins the Yellowstone River in Montana and ultimately
flows into the Missouri River.
On appeal, Hubenka alleged that the Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") unconstitutionally interpreted the Act to apply to a nonnavigable tributary. Further, Hubenka alleged that he did not violate
the Act by discharging pollutants because he did not add materials
from outside the river's banks. The court reviewed the construction
and the applicability of the Clean Water Act de novo.
The court first considered the constitutionality of the Corps' interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Under the Act, the Corps has the
authority to regulate dredge and fill activities on "navigable waters."
The statute defines "navigable waters" broadly as "waters of the United
States." The issue in the case was whether the Corps, which originally
applied the statute only to navigable-in-fact waters, could revise its
regulations to include tributaries of navigable waters under the broad
language of the statute.
In answering this question, the court utilized the two-step approach
prescribed in Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc. for reviewing an agency's interpretation of the statute it administers. Under this
test, the court must first determine whether Congress specifically ad-
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dressed the question at issue and if so, it will give express congressional
intent deference. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the
court will give the agency's interpretation deference as long as it is
permissible. Here, the court found that under the broad language of
the statute, along with its definition of navigable waters, Congress intended to regulate at least some non-navigable waters. However, because Congress did not delineate the extent of that regulation, the
court deemed the statute ambiguous and proceeded to the second step
of the analysis to determine whether the Corps' interpretation was
permissible.
The court evaluated the Supreme Court's decision in Solid Waste
Agency of North Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"),
to determine whether it had bearing on the Corps' interpretation. In
SWANCC, the United States Supreme Court struck down the Corps'
regulation of isolated, intrastate waters used as habitats for certain migratory birds on the premise that there was not sufficient "nexus" between the regulated waters at issue and navigable waters under the Act.
The SWANCC Court distinguished the holding in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. because the wetlands in that case were adjacent
to navigable waters, and thus had sufficient nexus for regulation. In
this case, the court concluded that although the tributaries that the
Corps sought to regulate were not adjacent, any pollution or fill
dumped in the tributaries had the potential to move downstream and
affect the quality of navigable waters, and thus sufficient nexus between
the tributaries and the navigable waters existed as required by the Supreme Court. The court held that the Corps' interpretation of the
Act's applicability to non-navigable tributaries was, therefore, permissible.
Finally, the court considered whether Hubenka violated the Act.
Hubenka argued that he did not add pollutants to the Wind River because he only disturbed the waters' banks. However, the Act prohibits
the discharge of any pollutant into waters of the United States and defines pollutant to include "dredged spoil," "rock," and "sand." The
court held that disturbing particulate matter on the banks without a
permit fell within this definition and affirmed the trial court's holding
regarding Hubenka's violations.
The court affirmed the ruling of the district court and held that
the Army Corps of Engineers' interpretation of the Clean Water Act
was permissible, that tributaries of navigable waters were within the
scope of regulation, and that Hubenka violated the Act.
Kathleen Ott

